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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The proceeding before the Second District Court, in and for Weber County
involved Blake William Waddoups, James Edward Sparrow, Jr., Plaintiffs and
Appellants, and The Amalgamated Sugar Company ("Amalgamated"), Defendant and
Appellee, case number 950900441. (R. 1)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0, (1953, as amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue Presented for Review: Were the legal determinations of the District Court
proper in awarding summary judgment to Defendant? (R. 780-807).
Standard of Review: Reviewed for correctness. See Rinderknecht v. Luck, 965
P.2d 564 (Utah App. 1998).
Issue Presentedfor Review: Does Utah law apply to Plaintiffs' claims under the
most significant contacts analysis, and was the District Court required to analyze all of
the contacts with respect to each element of each cause of action instead of simply
adopting Defendant's law of the situs analysis? (R. 781-785)
Standard of Review: Reviewed for correctness. See Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d
864 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

1

Issue Presented for Review: Are litigants and courts bound by the Code of Judicial
Administration? (R. 1087)
Standard of Review: Reviewed for correctness. See Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d
1251 (Utah 1997).
Issue Presented for Review: Did Plaintiffs' complaint fail to state a claim after the
court ruled that Idaho law applied simply because the word "Idaho" was not present?
Standard of Review: Reviewed for correctness. See S.L. v. State of Utah. 965 P.2d
551 (UtahCt. App. 1998). (R. 1170)
Issue Presented for Review: Did the court err in adopting Defendant's
interpretation of Plaintiffs' Complaint through which Defendant successfully attacked
undefended and indefensible positions instead of the actual allegations, or must a court
interpret all allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party? (R. 443-45,
450-51).
Standard of Review: Reviewed for correctness. See United Park City Mines Co. v.
Greater Park Citv Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).
Issue Presentedfor Review: Were each of Plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress
pre-empted by the LMRA? (R. 470-479).
Standard of Review: Reviewed for correctness. See United Park City Mines Co.
v. Greater Park Citv Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).
Issue Presented for Review: Where Defendant conducted no discovery into
2

Plaintiffs' emotional distress, ignored all of Plaintiffs' deposition testimony except for the
phrase "bummed out" and drew a tortured interpretation of Plaintiffs' Complaint, was
Defendant entitled to a summary judgment on Plaintiffs' cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress? (R. 1337-38).
Standard of Review: Reviewed for correctness. See United Park City Mines Co.
v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).
Issue Presented for Review: Did Plaintiffs state a cause of action for Intentional
Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage? (R. 479).
Standard of Review: Reviewed for correctness. See United Park City Mines Co.
v. Greater Park City Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).
Issue Presentedfor Review: Did the District Court err by granting a summary
judgment on Plaintiffs' cause of action for conspiracy where Defendant claimed that it
could not conspire with itself and Plaintiffs had "no evidence" of conspiracy with third
parties as a result of its two-year refusal to provide discovery of any facts which did not
support Defendant's arguments? (R. 480).
Standard of Review: Reviewed for correctness. See United Park City Mines Co.
v. Greater Park City Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).
Issue Presented for Review: Did the district court err when it ruled that Idaho had
not "extended" its wrongful discharge cause of action to persons other than at-will
employees? (R. 1056).
3

Standard of Review. Reviewed for correctness. See United Park City Mines Co.
v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).
Issue Presented for Review: Did the district court err when it refused to recognize a
"whistleblower" claim where the employees did not report the alleged wrongdoing to a
public authority? (R. 1059).
Standard of Review: Reviewed for correctness. See United Park City Mines Co.
v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993). (R. 1066-70).
Issue Presented for Review: Did the district court err when it ruled that Idaho's
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy cause of action which arises out of
nonnegotiable state-law rights independent of any right established by contract was,
nevertheless, preempted by the LMRA? (R. 1066-70)
Standard of Review: Reviewed for correctness. See United Park City Mines Co.
v. Greater Park City Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
(None)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDING, AND
DISPOSITION BELOW.

This is an appeal of the district court's grant of a summary judgment and a motion
to dismiss to Defendant on all causes of action.
The proceeding before the Second District Court, in and for Weber County
4

involved Blake William Waddoups, James Edward Sparrow, jr, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
and The Amalgamated Sugar Company ("Amalgamated"), Defendant and Appellee, case
number 950900441. (R. 1)
On November 5, 1997, Amalgamated moved for summary judgment based on its
contentions that, (1) Plaintiffs' claims were governed by Idaho law because all the events
pertinent to this matter took place in Twin Falls, Idaho; therefore all of Plaintiffs' claims
dealing with Utah law and public policy should be dismissed. (R. 331-35). (2) Plaintiffs'
claims for emotional distress should be dismissed because (a) the claims are barred by
Idaho's Workers' Compensation Statute; (b) Federal labor law preempts Plaintiffs'
emotional distress claims; and (c) essential elements of Plaintiff s emotional distress
claims were without support. (R. 335-39). (3) Plaintiffs' negligent or intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage claim is groundless. (R. 339-40). (4)
Plaintiffs conspiracy claim should be dismissed because Amalgamated cannot conspire
with itself. (R. 340). The District Court simply accepted all of Amalgamated's assertions
as true and granted the Motion on all points and allowing Plaintiffs to amend their
complaint to make the claims under Idaho law. (R. 919-20). The Order granting
Amalgamated's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed in the Second District Court on
April 9, 1998. (R. 918).
After Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint, On January 6, 1999, Amalgamated
filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. (R. 1019). Amalgamated
5

asserted that (1) That Idaho has not "extended" its protection of employees terminated in
violation of public policy beyond at-will employees; (2) That Idaho requires terminated
employees to have alerted public authorities, thus those who are fired for making threats
and otherwise resisting their employer's violations of public policy or attempting to
promote public policy internally have no legal protection; and (3) That federal law
preempts Idaho's cause of action because Idaho views the claim as arising out of the
contract (i.e., based on or related to a duty of good faith) which, in this case, is a
collective bargaining agreement governed by federal law. (R. 1020-21). The District
Court again simply accepted all of Amalgamated's assertions as true and granted their
Motion on all points, dismissing Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint with prejudice. (R.
1245-46). The Order granting Amalgamated's Motion to Dismiss was filed in the Second
District Court on May 4, 1999. (R. 1245).
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

a. Defendant Amalgamated operates a sugar processing plant in or near the City
of Twin Falls, State of Idaho (the "Twin Falls Factory"). (R. 2, 3)
b. Sometime in October of 1985 Mr. Waddoups began working at
Amalgamated's Twin Falls Factory under a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA")
containing a clause requiring a "just cause" for termination. (R. 3)
c. Sometime in September of 1989 Mr. Sparrow began working at
Amalgamated's Twin Falls Factory under a CBA containing a clause requiring a "just
6

cause" for termination. (R. 3)
d. Mr. Waddoups and Mr. Sparrow controlled the bulk-loading system on
different shifts at the Twin Falls Factory at all times material hereto.
e. Mr. Waddoups was fired on May 28, 1995. (R. 9)
f. Mr. Sparrow was fired on May 22, 1995. (R. 10)
g. On February 16, 1995, an employee of Amalgamated at the Twin Falls Factory
(Michael Davis) was caught in the bulk-loading system's conveyor belt, his arm was torn
from his body, and he bled to death. The arm of the deceased, his ground flesh, and a
large quantity of his blood entered the bulk-loading system and thereby contaminated and
adulterated all of the sugar then present in the system. (R. 4)
h. At the time of the fatal accident, Mr. Waddoups was in charge of the
movement of the bulk-loading system. (R. 4)
i. Mr. Waddoups and Mr. Sparrow participated in various stages of the complete
cleanup of the bulk-loading system necessitated by the accidental death and resulting
contamination. (R. 4-5)
j . Mr. Waddoups and Mr. Sparrow both informed Amalgamated that before the
death was discovered, some of the contaminated sugar was mixed with all of the
theretofore clean sugar because sugar that fell off the bulk-loading system's conveyor belt
was carried back into the main production scroll and therefrom was mixed into all seven
storage silos as a result of the design of the Twin Falls Factory's main scroll conveyor
7

system and faulty turn-off switches in the bulk-loading system. (R. 5)
k. On the same day, Mr. Waddoups placed "Quarantined" signs on both rail cars
and signed the seal report with the understanding communicated through Amalgamated's
agents that the Quarantined sugar in the rail cars would be destroyed. (R. 6)
1. On February 23, 1995 Amalgamated told all employees at a meeting held
subsequent to the accident that all the Quarantined sugar would be destroyed. (R. 7)
m. Contrary to Amalgamated's statements to its employees, on or about February
23, 1995, Amalgamated shipped the Quarantined Sugar across state lines to a pet food
producer. (R. 7)
n. On or about February 23, 1995 plaintiff, Mr. Waddoups advised Defendant,
Amalgamated, that all of its silos contained adulterated sugar because of the unsanitary
loading procedure that Amalgamated had ordered Mr. Waddoups to perform immediately
after the death. (R. 7)
o. Defendant ignored Mr. Waddoups's explanation of the cause and effect of the
contamination of its entire inventory. (R. 7)
p. Mr. Sparrow supported Mr. Waddoups's allegations and physically
accompanied him during the making of the complaints and requests that Amalgamated
investigate the extent of the adulteration at that time before defendant shipped any
adulterated sugar for sale to the public. (R. 6-7)
q. Sometime in March of 1995 when it appeared that they were being ignored,
8

Mr. Waddoups accompanied by Mr. Sparrow complained to Amalgamated that their
signatures accompanied the possibly unlawful shipments of adulterated sugar and voiced
concerns that the presence of their signatures might implicate them in Defendant's
criminal sales of adulterated sugar. (R. 7)
r. In addition, sometime in March of 1995, Plaintiffs told Amalgamated that they
did not want to continue signing documentation which accompanied shipments of
adulterated sugar until Amalgamated investigated the extent of the contamination. (R. 7)
s. Plaintiffs believed that all of the sugar in the Twin Falls Factory might be
contaminated by viruses such as hepatitis or HIV (the deceased employee was
homosexual and testing of his blood by the county was inconclusive) or that the sugar
could otherwise be adulterated by the presence of blood, flesh, the decomposition thereof,
or the presence of or feces from insects and rodents attracted thereto or any other
unanticipated putrid, filthy or unsanitary derivative substance that might have been
present as a result of the contamination. (R. 7)
t. As a result of their complaints, Defendant threatened Plaintiffs with termination
for the mistakes of others including threats of termination if sugar was not "in grade"
during plaintiffs' respective shift. These threats began shortly after the fatal accident and
continued until plaintiffs were wrongfully discharged. (R. 8)
u. In May of 1995, Plaintiffs reported to Amalgamated that they believed that the
rail cars in which the Quarantined sugar was stored were not cleaned according to
9

customer standards or applicable health safety standards when said cars were returned to
Amalgamated's Twin Falls factory. Amalgamated did not thereafter engage in the
cleaning process that was necessary for those rail cars. (R. 9)
v. On or about May 18, 1995, Mr. Waddoups finally threatened to reveal his
knowledge to applicable food safety agencies or, in the alternative, to advise the media.
(R.9)
w. Amalgamated immediately suspended Mr. Waddoups for two (2) working
days and warned plaintiff, Mr. Waddoups, that he should cease all discussions about the
healthfiilness or purity of Amalgamated's inventory of adulterated sugar. (R. 9)
x. On May 22, 1995, Mr. Sparrow was fired on the purported basis that he had
abused his sick leave. (R. 10)
y. On May 28, 1995 (the first day back from his suspension), Mr. Waddoups was
fired on the purported basis that he had been tardy too often. (R. 9)
z. The bases upon which Amalgamated relied in discharging Mr. Waddoups and
Mr. Sparrow are pretextual, without just cause and in violation of vital, overarching,
fundamental, permanent, clear, and substantial public policies of the State of Utah, the
State of Idaho, and the United States of America. (R. 9-10)
aa. Amalgamated discharged Plaintiffs with the intent, plan and motive to sell the
adulterated sugar without Plaintiffs' interference, threats, warnings, or reluctance to
participate. (R. 10-10a)
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bb. Amalgamated discharged plaintiffs in order to inhibit plaintiffs' ability to
witness evidence of defendant's continued sales of the adulterated sugar and thereby
conceal from the public the unsanitary status of its food product. (R. 10a)
cc. Defendant withheld medical treatment or psychological counseling from Mr.
Waddoups following the fatal accident at the Twin Falls Factory. (R. 11)
dd. Amalgamated was aware that Mr. Waddoups suffered from emotional
anguish in the aftermath of the fatal accident. (R. 11)
ee. Amalgamated offered counseling and gamma globulin shots after the accident
to any employee who desired them while consciously failing to offer this help to Mr.
Waddoups who was unaware of the options. (R. 11)
ff. Defendant made statements and accusations implying that by virtue of Mr.
Waddoups's control over the movement of the bulk-loading system, Mr. Waddoups was
responsible for the fatal accident. (R. 11-12)
gg. Sometime in March of 1995, Defendant stood behind Mr. Waddoups and
simulated a homosexual sex act in obvious reference to the blame placed on Mr.
Waddoups for the death of his deceased co-worker who was gay. (R. 11)
hh. Mr. Waddoups did and does suffer from insomnia, his relationships outside of
his employment were and are damaged because of mental distress caused by Defendant in
the aftermath of the accident. (R. 11-12)
ii. After Mr. Sparrow supported Mr. Waddoups's allegations in the aftermath of
11

the fatal accident, Defendant taunted Mr. Sparrow asking him frequently whether, on that
particular day, Defendant would be able to find an excuse to fire him. (R. 12)
jj. Defendant slapped Mr. Sparrow in the head, pulled his hair and informed him
that he would be terminated for any reason defendants might thereafter devise. (R. 12)
kk. Mr. Sparrow suffered emotional trauma from the physical and mental abuse
by Defendant which caused him to be emotionally unstable while performing his job, his
relationships outside of his employment were and are damaged because of mental distress
caused in the aftermath of the accident. (R. 12)
11. Amalgamated fired defendants, purportedly for cause, with the knowledge or
intent that such firing would severely hamper their opportunity for future employment
and that such firing would deprive them of unemployment benefits. (R. 13)
mm. Plaintiffs have been unable to secure comparable employment as a result of
being fired causing economic and psychological injury accompanying their loss of the
opportunity to engage in productive and satisfying occupations. (R. 13)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case involves the wrongful termination of Plaintiffs by Defendant and its
subsequent interference with their prospective economic advantage after Plaintiffs
threatened to "blow the whistle" on Defendant's improper conduct in connection with a
fatal accident in one of their sugar plants.
Plaintiffs are pursuing the following causes of action: (1) wrongful termination of
12

employment in violation of public policy; (2) negligent or intentional infliction of
emotional distress; (3) negligent or intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage; (4) civil conspiracy; (5) punitive damages. The questions presented to this
Court regard the propriety of the District Court's actions in granting Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.
In the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the District
Court ruled that (1) Plaintiffs' claims are governed by Idaho law, not Utah law; (2)
Plaintiffs' claim for wrongful discharge was dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiffs
failed to state a claim under Idaho law; (3) Plaintiffs' claim for negligent or intentional
infliction of emotional distress was dismissed because it is preempted by the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) and there was no evidence of emotional
suffering; (4) Plaintiffs' claim for interference with prospective economic advantage was
dismissed for lack of evidence; and (5) Plaintiffs' claim for civil conspiracy was
dismissed for lack of evidence of conspirators other than Defendant.
In the Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint, the District Court ruled that Plaintiffs' claim for public policy wrongful
discharge under Idaho law was dismissed because (a) Idaho law recognizes this kind of
wrongful discharge only in connection with employment at will; (b) Plaintiffs did not
report the misconduct to a public official; and (c) Plaintiffs' claim is preempted by the
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). This Court should review and
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reverse these two Orders and the District Court's other rulings that are errors in law.
First, Plaintiffs' claims are governed by the laws of Utah, not Idaho. Therefore,
the District Court's granting of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was
improper. The District Court improperly applied the "most significant relationship" test
to the facts of this case. Specifically, (a) the injury occurred in Utah; (b) it was Utah
public policy that Defendant violated; (c) Defendant is incorporated and managed in
Utah; (d) Plaintiff Waddoups' domicile is Utah; (e) the situs of the contract is irrelevant;
and (f) the location of the delivery of Plaintiffs' discharge is irrelevant.
Second, even if Idaho law does apply, there are questions of law and fact sufficient
to make summary judgment improper. Specifically, (a) the availability of administrative
rights in the collective bargaining agreement is irrelevant to this action; (b) Plaintiffs'
claims form a sufficient basis under Idaho's broad public policy exception; (c) federal law
does not preempt Idaho's cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy; (d) Plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress are factual questions for the jury; and
(e) there is sufficient question of fact to show that Defendant intentionally interfered with
Plaintiffs' prospective economic advantage.
Third, the fact that Plaintiffs did not report Defendant's misconduct to public
officials does not bar their claims. It is not necessary under either Idaho or Utah law, for
a whistleblowers to report to a public official to receive protection from state laws.
Fourth, Plaintiffs' Complaint need not specifically say the word "Idaho" to state a
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cause of action under Idaho law because Defendant received sufficient notice of
Plaintiffs' claims even in the absence of the word "Idaho."
Fifth, Plaintiffs' claim for civil conspiracy was improperly dismissed because
Defendant simply stated that there was no evidence of conspiracy, rather than following
proper procedures and averring that it did not conspire with anyone.
Sixth, Defendant deliberately took "facts" out of context and misrepresented
others, which were then relied upon by the District Court in granting the two Motions.
However, since the facts were misrepresented or false, they were inadmissible for
consideration by the court. Therefore, the two Motions were granted improperly.
Finally, the summary judgment was granted prematurely because Plaintiffs had not
yet had sufficient time to conduct discovery sufficient to uncover the facts necessary to
defend its allegations.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF
UTAH, THEREFORE, THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANTING OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS
IMPROPER.

In the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Summary
Judgment Order"), the District Court ruled that Plaintiffs' claims are governed by Idaho
law instead of Utah law. (Summary Judgment Order at 2); (R. 919). It claimed to have
used the "most significant relationship" test to reach this conclusion. (Summary
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Judgment Order at 2); (R. 919). However, as explained below, this conclusion is
incorrect. This Court should find that the District Court applied the most significant
relationship test improperly, and therefore, Utah law applies.
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE "MOST
SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP" TEST TO THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE.

It is the rule in Utah that when it must be decided whether Utah's laws or another
forum's laws will apply to the case at hand, the court shall apply the "most significant
relationship test" to determine which forum's laws will apply. See Records v. Briggs,
887 P.2d 865 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[Utah courts] apply the 'most significant
relationship' . . . in determining which state's law should apply in actions involving torts,
contracts, property interests, and the like.")
The District Court properly found that the "most significant relationship" test
should be used to this matter. However it improperly analyzed the facts by applying the
discredited lex loci delictus test. See Forsman v. Forsman. 779 P.2d 218, 219-20 (Utah
1989) (rejecting "law of the situs" analysis). The District Court simply stated that since
the Plaintiffs were in Idaho and all the alleged wrongful acts occurred in Idaho, it found
that Idaho laws applied. (Summary Judgment Order at 2); (R. 919). The court did not
attempt to apply the factors listed in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
(hereinafter the "Restatement") §§ 6 & 145, the source of the most significant relationship
test. The proper application of these factors inescapably leads to the conclusion that
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Utah's substantive law is the governing law. Section 145 of the Restatement provides as
follows:
§ 145.

The General Principle
(1)
The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to
an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state
which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the
principles stated in § 6.
(2)
Contacts to be taken into account in applying the
principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue
include:
(a)
the place where the injury occurred,
(b)
the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred,
(c)
the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the
parties, and
(d)
the place where the relationship, if any, between
the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue.

Restatement, § 145. The Court will take the above-listed considerations into account
when applying the principles listed below in § 6.
§ 6.

Choice-of-Law Principles
(1)
A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2)
When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the
choice of the applicable rule of law include:
(a)
the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b)
the relevant policies of the forum,
(c)
the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of
the particular issue,
(d)
the protection of justified expectations,
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(e)
the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f)
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g)
ease in the determination and application of the law to
be applied.
Restatement, §6. The value goals of § 6 and the contacts of § 145 should be "evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to" Plaintiffs' causes of action.1
Restatement, § 145.
In this case, the most important factors are: (A) The place where the injury
occurred, Restatement § 145(2)(a); (B) The relevant policies of the forum, Restatement,
§ 6(2)(b); (C) The relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue, Restatement § 6(2)(b); (D) The
basic policies underlying the particular field of law, Restatement § 6(2)(d); and (E) Ease
in the determination and application of the law to be applied, Restatement § 6(2)(g).
The District Court utterly failed to explain the relevant policies underlying Idaho
law or to compare the relative interests of Idaho and Utah in the determination of the
particular issues in this matter. (Summary Judgment Order at 2); (R. 919); Restatement, §
6(2)(b). Therefore, since the District Court improperly applied the most significant
relationships test, this Court should reverse the Summary Judgment Order.
B.

PURSUANT TO RESTATEMENT § 145(2)(a), THE INJURY

1

"If two or more states having contacts with the parties or the transactions will
have the policies underlying their different tort rules advanced, apply the law that will
favor the plaintiff." Russell Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws at 360 (3d
Ed. 1986) (emphasis added).
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OCCURRED IN UTAH, THEREFORE, UTAH LAW APPLIES.
The injury for which Plaintiffs seek redress is Defendant's violation of Utah's
clear and substantial public policies regarding food safety and the termination of
employees who advance those public policies. The "injury" is not the amount of money
damages sought by Plaintiffs, but is the contravention of Utah's vital state interests,
including the damage to public health in the form of food safety and the damage to
employment relationships perpetrated by a Utah corporation. See Restatement, §§
145(2)(a),(b).
The case of Doe v. Nevada Crossing. Inc.. explains the difference between the
"money damages" suffered by Plaintiffs and the "injury" which occurred in the State of
Utah. 920 F.Supp 164 (D.Utah 1996). In Doe, the plaintiffs, a husband and wife, were
violently assaulted in a hotel in Wendover, Nevada. See idL at 165. The dispute in Doe
centered on the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to add a claim for loss of
consortium. See kL Utah does not recognize a cause of action for loss of consortium
while Nevada does. See id. The court held that "[t]he wrongful conduct of defendants
occurred in Nevada. The injury to the plaintiffs' persons from the assault was in Nevada.
The injury to the plaintiffs9 consortium was in Utah." Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
The judge found that the injury complained of occurred in Utah because the marital union
existed in Utah, and a consortium claim is a claim of injury to the marital union. See id.
Finally, the judge concluded that Utah law applies because "[t]he interest in choice of law
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is that of the states involved not the individual parties," and Utah has the more significant
relationship to the marital union that was injured by the violent assault. IdL (citing
Restatement, § 6). Just as Mr. and Mrs. Doe's consortium was injured in Utah, the injury
to Utah's public policy which is underlies Plaintiffs' claims occurred in Utah. Therefore,
Utah laws apply to Plaintiffs' claims.
C.

PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL
TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY IS A
CLAIM THAT DEFENDANT VIOLATED UTAH'S PUBLIC
POLICY, THEREFORE, THE PLACE OF THE INJURY IS UTAH.

Defendant's violation of public policy rendered an otherwise private matter
repugnant to the public good. The "public policy exception" states that when an
employee is fired in a manner or for a reason that contravenes a clear and substantial
public policy, society will impose sanctions on the employer. See Peterson v. Browning,
832 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Utah 1992). Actions by an employee which are protected under the
public policy exception include: "(1) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, (2)
performing a public obligation, or (3) exercising a legal right or privilege."2 Id, Actions
by an employee merit legal protection in this State "when the statutory language
expressing the public conscience is clear and when the affected interests of society are
substantial." Id. at 1282.

2

Plaintiffs' conduct fell into categories (1) & (3). Plaintiffs refused to commit
criminal acts, and they promoted public policy. Category (2) usually applies to such
conduct as performing jury duty.
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Firing those who attempt to further clear and substantial public policy gives rise to
a cause of action in tort because the injury caused by such an action is perpetrated against
the public, as opposed to the parties only.
[T]he vindication of public policy worked by the tort cause of action cannot
be accomplished by a contractual provision that prohibits discharges for any
but just cause. Even when a contract prohibits conduct that also would
violate public policy, the remedies for breach of that contract would satisfy
only the private interests of the parties to the agreement, i.e., by restoring a
wrongfully discharged employee to his or her position and making him or
her whole. There is no reason to expect that these remedies would be as
draconian as those that might be available under the tort cause of action,
remedies that are designed not only to remedy the breach and make the
employee whole but to deter and punish violations of vital state interest.
While any employer violating a contractual just-cause standard of dismissal
should be liable for breaking its promise to its employee . . . an employer
who violates clear and substantial public policies should be liable for the
more expansive penalties of tort, a potentially harsher liability
commensurate with the greater wrong against society. When an
employer's act violates both the contractual just-cause standard and a clear
and substantial public policy, we see no reason to dilute the force of the
double sanction. In such an instance, the employer is liable for two
breaches, one in contract and one in tort. It therefore must bear the
consequences of both.
Retherford v. AT & T Communications. 844 P.2d 949, 955 (Utah 1992) (citing Peterson.
832 P.2d 1280) (emphasis added).
The State of Utah has a strong interest in providing "an incentive for employers to
refrain from using their unique economic position to coerce employee conduct that
contravenes clear and substantial public policies. Moreover, it will encourage employees
to engage in lawful conduct and report violations of the law." Peterson 832 P.2d at 1285
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Furthermore, Utah protects employees whether the applicable law forming the basis of
the public policy "is that of Utah, the federal government, or another state." Id. at 1283.
On the other hand, Idaho has no interest in the injury suffered by Utah's public.3
Food which is contaminated in Idaho does not stay in Idaho. The interest in guarding
against such befouled food brought into Utah by protecting employees who further that
interest and seek protection in Utah courts gives Utah a more significant interest in
protecting Plaintiffs than Idaho. The place of the conduct causing the injury bears little
relation to the governmental interests of the two potentially interested states. The injury,
in the instant case, was an injury to this state's vital interest in clean food and its interest
in protecting those who are fired for promoting this clear and substantial public policy.
If Idaho law would also dictate that Defendant violated clear and substantial public
policies, then the conflict between Idaho law and Utah law is a "false conflict" because
both State's laws are the same. Where the Court encounters a "false conflict," the Court
should apply its own law with which it is more familiar and adept. See Restatement, §
6(2)(g). Furthermore, "[i]f the Court finds that a conflict between the legitimate interest
of the two states is unavoidable, it should apply the law of the forum." Currie, Duke L.J.
at 178 (1959).

3

"If the Court finds that one state has an interest in the application of its policy in
the circumstances of the case and the other has none, it should apply the law of the
interested state." Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of
Laws. Duke L.J. 171, 178 (1959).
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In short, the tort of wrongful termination in violation of public policy has been
adopted by the State of Utah to regulate the conduct of employers. Plaintiffs simply seek
to invoke Utah law to regulate the activity of a Utah corporation. Obviously, Idaho has
some contacts to Defendant's shameful conduct; however, Utah's "interest in assuring
that [Utah] corporations abide by its laws generally, and specifically that they do not
engage in illegal [shipment of contaminated food to Utah and elsewhere] is primary, and
mandates the application of [Utah] law in this case." Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 832
P.2d 537, 544 (Wash.App.Div 1 1992).
D.

PURSUANT TO RESTATEMENT, § 145(2)(b), THE CONDUCT
CAUSING THE INJURY TO UTAH'S PUBLIC POLICY
ORIGINATED WITH DEFENDANT'S MANAGEMENT, WHICH
IS BASED IN UTAH.

The state of Utah has a strong interest in regulating the unlawful actions of its
citizens and in protecting its citizens from unlawful abuse. If a Utah corporation does
business in other states where it wreaks havoc (especially when that havoc returns to Utah
in the form of adulterated food), Utah has a strong interest in applying its laws to regulate
and protect its citizens.
In the Summary Judgment Order, the District Court ruled that "there is no
evidence in the record of any conduct by Amalgamated Sugar in Utah related to
plaintiffs." (Summary Judgment Order at 2); (R. 919). However, the record shows that
Defendant is incorporated in Utah and manages its factories from its headquarters in
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Ogden, Utah. (Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
at 9 ("Defendant's S.J. Memo"); (R. 332). Because the corporation is located and
managed in Utah, Utah law applies to this matter.
E.

PURSUANT TO RESTATEMENT, § 145(2)(c), THE DOMICILE
OF PLAINTIFF WADDOUPS IS UTAH, THEREFORE, UTAH
LAW APPLIES.

Plaintiff Blake Waddoups is a domiciliary of Utah. Utah is Mr. Waddoups's
domicile of origin (he was bom here) and it is his domicile of choice (he intends to return
here). The District Court correctly stated that both Plaintiffs resided in Idaho at the time
when Defendant fired them. (Summary Judgment Order at 2); (R. 919). However, the
court failed to address the "domicile" of Plaintiffs. Domicile is determined largely by the
subjective intent of the parties. "'Domicile is the most steadfast of the words, and is
pretty well anchored in legal literature so far as meaning is concerned. Residence, on the
other hand, has an evasive way about it, with as many colors as Joseph's coat.'"
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672 at n. 1 (Utah 1982) (quoting
Weible v. United States. 244 F.2d 158, 163 (9th Cir. 1957)).
Two-thirds of the parties (Defendant and one-half of the Plaintiffs) are domiciled
in the state of Utah. Therefore, Utah has a predominant continuing interest in applying its
laws to this case involving its citizens, and Utah law applies in this matter.
F.

THE CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANT
IS NOT RELEVANT TO DEFENDANT'S TORTIOUS
CONDUCT, THEREFORE, THE SITUS IN WHICH THE
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CONTRACT WAS ENTERED IS IRRELEVANT.
"Because the public policy exception is imposed by law, the . . . agreement is
involved only because it forms the basis of the relationship; the agreement is tangential to
the" tortious misconduct. Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1284. The CBA entered into between
Plaintiffs and Defendant formed the basis of the relationship between the parties;
however, the breach of the just-cause term of the contract was merely tangential to
Defendant's breach of its duty to the people of Utah to not violate clear public policy.
Therefore, the situs in which the contract was entered is irrelevant.
G.

THE LOCATION OF DEFENDANT'S DELIVERY OF
PLAINTIFFS' DISCHARGES IS IRRELEVANT.

In the Summary Judgment Order, the District Court concluded, without analysis or
citation to relevant legal authority that because Plaintiffs lived and worked in Idaho at the
time they were fired, Idaho laws apply to this matter. (Summary Judgment Order at 2);
(R. 919). In other words, the court presented the lex loci delictus test in substance while
proclaiming the most significant relationship test in form.
In order to properly apply the most significant contacts analysis, Defendant was
required to discuss the nature of the injury protected by each and every cause of action
and to provide supported, undisputed testimony or evidence regarding facts material to
each and every element of each and every cause of action. However, Defendant simply
lumped everything together and asserted that the state where the discharge occurs is the
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state whose governing law applies. (Defendant's S.J. Memo at 9); (R. 332). It attempted
to support this broad and unfounded conclusion by citing to Pacheco v. Hercules, 61 FEP
Cases (BNA) 825, 826-27 (D.Utah 1993); (Defendant's S.J. Memo at 9); (R. 332). The
Pacheco court stated that Georgia law applied because that was where the plaintiff was
discharged. See 61 FEP Cases (BNA) at 826-27 In making this conclusion, the court
utterly failed to discuss the causes of action alleged by the plaintiff, the relevant legal
standards applicable thereto, and failed to explain its reasoning at all. See id.
The trial court acted as though that holding were binding precedent by following
Defendant's arguments without further analysis. (Summary Judgment Order at 2); (R.
919). "While federal cases are instructive, and perhaps even persuasive, they are by no
means authoritative and certainly not controlling." Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc.,
952 P.2d 1058 at n. 4 (Utah 1998). Like the Pacheco court, the District court simply
ruled that Idaho's laws governed, without giving any reasons for the ruling. In the face of
such a lack of legal argument, Plaintiffs' argument stands that the situs of Defendant's
delivery of Plaintiffs' discharges is irrelevant to deciding whether Utah or Idaho law
applies in this matter.
II.

EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT IDAHO LAW APPLIES,
THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT SUFFICIENT TO
MAKE THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANTING OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IMPROPER.

In both the Summary Judgment Order and the Order Dismissing Plaintiffs'
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Amended Complaint ("Order of Dismissal"), the District Court held, in effect, that Idaho
allows a business to violate its public policy so long as the business employs its workers
under a union contract. (Summary Judgment Order at 2-3); (Order of Dismissal at 2); (R.
919-20, 1246). This holding is based on the assertion that Idaho provides contract
damages as the remedy available under the cause of action for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy. (Summary Judgment Order at 2-3); (Order of Dismissal at 2);
(R. 919-20, 1246).
The District Court also held that Plaintiffs' claims are preempted by federal law in
that their rights under their CBA supplanted the state right of action provided for the
purpose of protecting public rights. (Summary Judgment Order at 2-3); (Order of
Dismissal at 2); (R. 919-20, 1246). As will be described below, the United States
Supreme Court has addressed this argument and soundly rejected it. Because the cause of
action of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and the acts, rules, and
regulations of Congress can be easily reconciled, there is no preemption in this case.
A.

THE AVAILABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS
NEGOTIATED FOR AND INCLUDED IN THE CBA IS
NOT RELEVANT TO THIS STATE-LAW ACTION.

The District Court held in the Summary Judgment Order that Plaintiffs' claims are
dismissed because their CBA provided for a grievance and arbitration process.
(Summary Judgment Order at 2); (R. 919). However, in the present matter, it is the
public policy that is relevant, not the discharge. The discharge itself (and the "just cause"
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requirement under the CBA) only gives rise to private interests between the employee and
the employer. The public policy exception requires a public aspect to the firing which
makes the firing unlawful. See Peterson. 832 P.2d at 1282 (quoting Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp.. 765 P.2d 373, 379 (Cal. 1988)).
The fact of a discharge is only an element of the wrongful discharge cause of
action, not the underpinning of the cause of action.4 The public policy exception (through
an award of damages pursuant to state law) regulates as effectively as forms of preventive
relief. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon. 359 U.S. 236. 247 (1959). Thus,
the courts have provided a wrongful discharge remedy to protect the public interests,
whereas the unions created a just cause remedy to protect the private interests of union
members.
Idaho acknowledges the right of union workers to maintain a cause of action based
upon state law. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld a jury instruction "which
4

To make out a prima facie case of wrongful discharge, an employee must show:
(i) that his employer terminated him; (ii) that a clear and substantial public
policy existed; (iii) that the employee's conduct brought the policy into
play; and (iv) that the discharge and the conduct bringing the policy into
play are causally connected. As to subpart (iv), the employee initially need
only show that the conduct bringing the public policy into play "was a
cause of the firing." If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the
employer must then articulate a legitimate reason for the discharge. When
faced with evidence of a legitimate reason for termination, the employee
must prove that engaging in the protected conduct was a "substantial factor"
in the employer's motivation to discharge the employee."
Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores. 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted).
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instructed that a termination based on legal union activities would be contrary to public
policy established by the Legislature." Hummer v. Evans. 923 P.2d 981, 986 (Idaho
1996); see also Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744 at n. 1 (Idaho 1989)
(allowing the breach of contract claim to be tried together with violation of public policy
claim). Therefore, the availability of administrative rights as included in the CBA is
irrelevant.
B.

IDAHO'S VERSION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION IS
VERY BROAD AND PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FORM A
SUFFICIENT BASIS TO MAKE THEIR PUBLIC POLICY
CLAIMS.

Idaho has described the public policy exception and the duty of good faith and fair
dealing as "principles under which freedom of contract of private dealing is restricted by
law for the good of the community." Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist.. 563 P.2d 54,
58 (Idaho 1977) (citation omitted). Idaho's public policy exception is based upon the
constructive duties of good faith and fair dealing which "are implied obligations of every
contract." Luzar v. Western Surety Co.. 692 P.2d 337, 340 (Idaho 1984).
The duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed on employment contracts is
extremely broad in Idaho. Idaho's supreme court stated:
[W]e conclude that any action by either party which violates, nullifies or
significantly impairs any benefit of the employment contract is a violation
of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing which we
adopt today.
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Metcalf. 778 P.2d at 750.5
Under Idaho law, public policy is implicated by any firing "motivated by bad faith
or malice or based on retaliation [because such conduct] is not the best interest of the
economic system or the public good." Jackson, 563 P.2d at 58; see also Burdick v.
American Express Co.. 677 F.Supp 228 (S.D. N.Y. 1988) (noting that a distinction
between "preventive" and "retaliatory" dismissals would serve no useful purpose). The
sine qua non of Plaintiffs' claims against Amalgamated is Amalgamated's misconduct
with respect to clean food and Plaintiffs' staunch opposition thereto. (Amended
Complaint atffl[19-30, 32-34, 40-44); (R. 1000-07). Plaintiffs' claims do not depend
upon any contractual term negotiated for and included in the CBA. Therefore, because
Plaintiffs' claims are sufficient under Idaho law, the District Court's Order of Dismissal
should be reversed.
C.

FEDERAL LAW DOES NOT PREEMPT IDAHO'S CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY BECAUSE THE COURT WILL NOT BE
REQUIRED TO INTERPRET THE CBA.

Because Plaintiffs' cause of action exists separate and apart from the CBA (i.e., it
is not a contract cause of action), the claim is not pre-empted by the Labor Management

5

Another example of this type of cause of action arising because of a contract but
not being a suit on the contract is the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Interwest
Construction v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350 (Utah 1996) (explaining that the duty to perform
contractual duties in such a manner as to not injure persons or property arises from law,
not contract); Restatement (Second) of Torts §324A (1965).
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Relations Act ("LMRA"). See Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters. 430 U.S.
290, 305-06 (1977) (holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against
union and officials was not pre-empted).6
The District Court held that § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) preempts
Plaintiffs' causes of action. (Summary Judgment Order at 2); (R. 919). However, the
United States Supreme Court has stated that:
[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement,
on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing
precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be
resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is
"independenf'of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.
Retherford. 844 P.2d at 955 (quoting Lingle. 486 U.S. at 409-10). Under the
circumstances of this case, there is no § 301 preemption.
In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck. the United States Supreme Court
held that "when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent
upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a
labor contract," the claim is preempted by § 301. 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).
However, the court also drew the following distinction between Plaintiffs'
claims and claims arising out of agreements negotiated by the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement:
Section 301 on its face says nothing about the substance of what private
parties may agree to in a labor contract. Nor is there any suggestion that
Congress, in adopting § 301, wished to give the substantive provisions of
private agreements the force of federal law, ousting any inconsistent state
6

The test of LMRA preemption was also explained by the United States Supreme
Court in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck. 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (ruling that a state action
asserting a right related to a CBA is not pre-empted unless it is "inextricably intertwined"
with the CBA); and Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef. Inc.. 486 U.S. 399 (1988)
(holding that a retaliatory discharge action was not pre-empted).
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regulation. Such a rule of law would delegate to unions and unionized
employers the power to exempt themselves from whatever state labor
standards they disfavored. Clearly, § 301 does not grant the parties to
a collective-bargaining agreement the ability to contract for what is
illegal under state law. In extending the pre-emptive effect of § 301
beyond suits for breach of contract, it would be inconsistent with
congressional intent under that section to pre-empt state rules that
proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a
labor contract.
* *

*

Therefore, state-law rights and obligations that do not exist independently
of private agreements, and that as a result can be waived or altered by
agreement of private parties, are pre-empted by those agreements. Our
analysis must focus, then, on whether the Wisconsin tort action for
breach of the duty of good faith as applied here confers nonnegotiable
state-law rights on employers or employees independent of any right
established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is
inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor
contract.
Id at 211-13 (footnotes and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
The Utah Court of Appeals has explained that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing is non-negotiable: "While it is true that courts impose an obligation of good faith
in every aspect of the contractual relationship . . . the obligation of good faith is
'constructive' rather than 'implied'" because the obligation is imposed by law and cannot
be disclaimed." PDO Lube Ctr.. Inc. v. Huber. 949 P.2d 792 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting
Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr.. Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs.. Inc.. 889 P.2d 445, 450
n.4 (Utah App. 1994)) (emphasis added); see also Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d
795, 801 at n. 4 (Utah 1985) (in first-party contract, the "duty to perform the contract in
good faith cannot, by definition, be waived by either party to the agreement.")
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(emphasis added). The duty of good faith and fair dealing is non-negotiable, therefore,
Plaintiffs' causes of action are not preempted under Allis-Chalmers because this Court
can determine whether the defendants have engaged in conduct prohibited by Idaho law
without referring to or interpreting the CBA. In other words, the court will not need to
refer to the CBA in order to rule that firing employees who attempt to remedy
Amalgamated's poisoning of the food supply is conduct that Idaho does not condone.
D.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LMRA UNDER THE
RETHERFORD ANALYSIS.

In 1992, this Court handed down the opinion of Retherford v. AT&T
Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). In Retherford. this Court discussed in detail
the circumstances under which a tort claim filed against an employer by an employee
would be preempted by the LMRA.
The court explained the test as follows: "To Determine whether this tort claim is
preempted, we must determine whether . . . there is any basis for concluding that
defendant's conduct alleged to provide a basis for the tort claim might reasonably
implicate any of the terms of the [CBA]." Id, at 971 (citing Lingle. 486 U.S. 399).
The Retherford court adopted the distinction between "purely personal
misconduct, as opposed to misconduct under color of possible contractual authority." Id.
at 972. The court concluded that certain conduct alleged by Ms. Retherford was
"supervisory" and thus contractual: AT&T ordered Ms. Retherford to transfer to Boise, it
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told her to stop complaining, it told her where to sit, it assigned her certain tasks. See Id..
The court concluded that certain other conduct alleged by Ms. Retherford was purely
personal: following her around the office, making threatening faces, attempting to
frighten her as she walked across the street. See Id.
In the present case, Defendant's misconduct was purely personal. First, Defendant
failed to provide Mr. Waddoups with psychological counseling and gamma globulin shots
which were provided to all other employees. (Complaint at ^f 47); (R. 11). It is true that
the decision to offer psychological counseling is a supervisory function which would be
pre-empted; however, it is not a supervisory function to single-out one person to whom
counseling and medical help would not be offered. At the very least, this is a material
disputed fact.
Second, Defendant implied that Mr. Waddoups was responsible for the death of his
co-worker, that he was responsible for the contamination of all of the sugar in the factory,
and he would be the scapegoat if criminal charges were brought. (Complaint at ^ 47(a));
(R. 11). If these managers had made a thorough investigation and had "exercised their
contractual authority" by naming Mr. Waddoups as the culpable party, then their
misconduct would be pre-empted. Instead, they harassed him with false and unfounded
accusations.
Third, Mr. Sparrow's supervisor slapped him and taunted him frequently by asking
him whether, on that particular day, he would be able to find an excuse to fire him.
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(Complaint at U 48); (R. 12). In Retherford. the court examined physical abuse (which is
clearly personal) and threats of firing for complaining about a co-worker's homosexual
advances. The court held that Ms. Retherford's supervisor exercised her supervisory
authority when she told Ms. Retherford to stop complaining or she might be fired. It is
true that the use of supervisory authority to quell dissension among employees is
"supervisory" even if it is done improperly with an improper motive (for LMRA preemption purposes). See kL Therefore, if Plaintiffs simply alleged threats to fire, such an
allegation would be pre-empted. However, Plaintiffs allege threats to fire that are not
based upon performance or made under the color of any contractual authority; but rather,
are coupled with unwarranted physical abuse which (one assumes) is not the subject of
any provision of the CBA.
Fourth, one of Defendant's managers stood behind Mr. Waddoups during exercises
and simulated a homosexual act. (Complaint at 1J47(b)); (R.l 1). The reference of the
obscene act was Mike Davis (the fatally injured co-worker who was gay) and the blame
that the manager personally intended to place upon Mr. Waddoups for the death of his coworker. Again, one assumes that simulated, homosexual sex-acts are not within the
description of authority and responsibility as set forth in the CBA.
Whether a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is preempted by the
LMRA depends on the degree of outrageousness of the conduct and the manner in which
the conduct was performed. See Farmer, at 305-06 (holding that intentional infliction of
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emotional distress claim against union and officials was not preempted by the LMRA
under the "abusive manner" exception). The test is whether the state law cause of action
is "inextricably intertwined" with the state law cause of action. In this case, the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim requires that the Court look at the
conduct of the employer without interpreting the CBA. Such an analysis is a question of
fact, and therefore, inappropriate in deciding a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the Summary Judgment Order in this matter.
E.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE
FACTUAL QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY.

The District Court ruled in its Summary Judgment Order that it found no evidence
that either plaintiff suffered a severe or disabling emotional condition. (Summary
Judgment Order at 3); (R. 920). The court appears to have made this decision on reliance
of Defendant's argument that Plaintiff Sparrow described himself as being merely
"bummed out" after being fired. (Defendant's S.J. Memo at 16); (R. 339). This is true,
but it is hardly material to and certainly not dispositive of the question of whether, in fact,
Mr. Sparrow suffered severe emotional distress — a classic question of fact for the jury.
Furthermore, being "bummed out" is hardly the most eloquent description one's mindset
or emotional state of being. However, lack of eloquence does not foreclose the possibility
that genuine emotional distress was in fact suffered. Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291
(Utah 1978) (holding that where the parties were not in complete conflict as to certain
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facts, but the understanding, intention, and consequences of those facts were vigorously
disputed, the matter was not proper for summary judgment and could only be resolved by
a trial).
The truth is that both Plaintiffs testified in their depositions that they have suffered
disabling emotional distress. For example, Mr. Sparrow could not emotionally bring
himself to look for work for an entire month after his unlawful firing. (Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 36); (R.
806). As for Mr. Waddoups, he testified that his wife could not sleep in the same bed
with him because "I would wake up screaming in the middle of the night in a cold sweat
and actually hurt her by thrashing around in his sleep. It all goes back to this Mike Davis
crap." See id; (R. 806).
The above facts, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, would at least
suffice to create an issue of material fact. Therefore, Defendant did not meet its legal
duty to show the non-existence of material disputed facts and the Summary Judgment
Order should be reversed.. See Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928
(Utah 1993) ("As the moving party, [Defendant] had the affirmative burden of
establishing that there were no material issues of fact as to its liability.").
F.

DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY INTERFERED WITH
PLAINTIFFS' PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE.

The tort of interference with prospective economic advantage can be proven if
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Defendant interfered with Plaintiffs' future employment possibilities for an improper
purpose or by improper means. See Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293
(Utah 1982) (emphasis added); Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998 (Utah App. 1989).
After Plaintiffs' firings, Mr. Sparrow applied to work with a contractor who did
work for Defendant at its Twin Falls Factory. When the contractor called Defendant.
Defendant refused allow the contractor to bring Mr. Sparrow onto its premises, therefore,
Mr. Sparrow was not hired. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment at 36); (R. 806). Also, Mr. Sparrow would have been
hired at Oreida; however, after Oreida called Defendant, Oreida revoked its offer. See
14; (R. 806)
Moreover, firing Plaintiffs for unlawful reasons satisfies the elements of this tort.
Any reasonable person knows that if a person is fired for bad conduct, the person's workhistory is stained and the bad smell lingers indefinitely. Defendant's pretextual firings
interfered with Plaintiffs' ability to gain decent employment. In fact, both Plaintiffs
continue to struggle with miserable jobs making poor wages because of Defendant's
misconduct.
Finally, this Court has already ruled that "discharge of an employee because of his
failure to violate a clear and substantial public policy is an 'improper purpose.'"
Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1284. Therefore, this Court should find that there is sufficient
evidence and question of fact to reverse the Summary Judgment Order and Order of
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Dismissal.
III.

THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFFS DID NOT REPORT
DEFENDANT'S MISCONDUCT TO GOVERNMENTAL
AUTHORITIES DOES NOT BAR THEIR CLAIM

In its Order of Dismissal, the District Court held that because Plaintiffs did not
report Defendants' adulteration of the food supply to a public authority, they failed to
state a whistleblower claim under Idaho law. (Order of Dismissal at 2); (R. 1246).
However, the court failed to provide any authority for this position, apparently relying
solely on Defendant's statement that, "Courts generally have refused to recognize
"whistleblower" claims where the employee did not report the alleged wrongdoing to a
public authority." (Defendant's Dismissal Memo at 15); (R. 1042).
On the contrary, whistleblowers who complain internally, but who have not
contacted an appropriate enforcement authority are generally protected by state laws.
See Westman, Daniel P., Whistleblowing. The Law of Retaliatory Discharge at 114
(1991). "[T]he rationale . . . is that loyal employees, who do not go outside their
organizations, should not have less protection than employees who could be considered
more disruptive by complaining outside their organizations." Id Furthermore, counsel
for Defendant's own law firm, Parsons Behle & Latimer, has defined whistleblowing as
including "employees who raise questions about improper practices through their
employers' internal channels." Parsons Behle & Latimer, 7th Annual Employment Law
Seminar, at 72 (April 27, 1995).
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This Court stated in Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992),
We do not agree that plaintiff cannot meet a public policy requirement
simply because he did not report the violation to the Attorney General or to
the Commissioner. Plaintiff pursued all internal methods for resolving the
problem; he need not have gone outside the Bank to try to correct the policy
violation.
Id. at 838. Subsequent to Heslop. the Supreme Court issued the opinion of Fox v. MCI
Communications Corp.. in which it stated, "[T]he termination of a private sector
employee in retaliation for the good faith reporting to company management of alleged
[statutory] violations by co-workers . . . does not implicate a clear and substantial public
policy of the state of Utah." 931 P.2d 857 (Utah 1997). At first blush, it appears that the
court overruled its Heslop holding, but the two cases are easily distinguished. See Carrier
v. Pro-Tech Restoration. 909 P.2d 271, 276 (Utah App. 1995) (expressing unwillingness
to read one case as overruling another sub silentio because "the two situations are so
different"). In Heslop. the plaintiff claimed that the defendant fired him because of his
insistence that the defendant bank comply with the Utah Financial Institutions Act. The
court concluded that the act "serves a substantial public policy because it protects the
public as well as regulates the institutions themselves." 839 P.2d at 837 (emphasis
added).
However, in Fox, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant fired her after she
reported violations of criminal laws relating to "computer fraud." 931 P.2d at 860. The
computer fraud related to "churning" accounts to meet internal quotas and to earn higher
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commissions. See id In other words, the victim of the alleged crime was the defendant
itself and not the public. "The churning and creation of 'new' accounts, while clearly
intended to produce higher pay for the employees, was a practice defendant knew about
and, by tolerating it, acquiesced in. For that reason, the corporation was not defrauded."

14
This Court further analyzed the internal vs. external reporting issue in another
case, stating,
In contrast [to the court's suggestion in Fox v. MCI], we suggested in
Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992), that where there is a
clear and substantial public policy affected by the employer's conduct,
internal reporting alone may support a wrongful discharge claim. See
Heslop, 839 P.2d at 838.
*

*

*

Although Heslop suggests that any internal reporting will support a
wrongful discharge claim, we emphasize that only internal reporting that
furthers a clear and substantial public policy will satisfy the third
element [i.e., exercising a legal right or privilege] of a wrongful discharge
claim.
Ryan. 972 P.2d 395 (emphasis added). This Court also set forth four categories where
clear and substantial public policy is implicated:
(i) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, such as refusing to
violate the antitrust laws; (ii) performing a public obligation, such as
accepting jury duty; (iii) exercising a legal right or privilege, such as
filing a workers compensation claim; or (iv) reporting to a public
authority criminal activity of the employer.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Under Utah law a person may pursue a public
policy claim if the public policy relied upon is "clear and substantial." Obviously, the
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sale of poisoned food brings a clear and substantial public policy claim into play.
In sum, Plaintiffs alleged that they threatened to reveal the unsanitary conditions of
Defendant's inventory shortly before being fired.7 During the two months which passed
between the contamination and Plaintiffs' firings, Plaintiffs made clear their refusals to
engage in illegal activity and actively sought to determine whether merely holding
adulterated food constitutes a criminal violation. Plaintiffs demanded that Defendant
conduct a thorough investigation. Plaintiffs diligently demanded that Defendant follow
its own rules on conducting investigations regarding contamination after they found out
that Defendant performed a sham investigation. The foregoing states a claim for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy because Plaintiffs furthered public
policy and refused to engage in illegal activities. The allegations regarding
Amalgamated's violation of public policy interest "are not dependent on reporting them
to an outside agency; they stand on their own." Verduzco v. General Dynamics, 742 F.
Supp 559, 562 (S.D. Cal. 1990). Therefore, because the District Court's conclusions of
law were incorrect, this Court should reverse the District Court's Order of Dismissal.
IV.

PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION
UNDER IDAHO LAW WITHOUT INVOKING THE WORD
"IDAHO"

In its Summary Judgment Order, the District Court held that because Plaintiffs'
7

See e ^ , Gifford v. Atchinson. Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.. 685 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir.
1982) (holding, in the Title VII context, that there is no legal distinction between filing a
complaint and threatening to file a complaint).
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claims were based on Utah law, they failed to state a claim under Idaho law. (Summary
Judgment Order at 2); (R. 919). In other words, because Plaintiffs alleged that the facts of
this case support a cause of action for the violation of Utah public policy (a legal
conclusion), the facts upon which Plaintiffs rely do not support a claim for wrongful
discharge under Idaho law because Plaintiffs do not explicitly state in their complaint the
legal conclusion that Defendant violated Idaho public policy. Essentially, the court ruled
that Plaintiffs must say: "Idaho" or else their complaint is deficient.
Even if Idaho law applies to the substantive claims made by Plaintiffs, Utah law
still governs the procedural issues. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires simply that
"a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief...shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled." The pleadings must be
sufficient to give "fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general
indication of the type of litigation involved." Blackham v. Snelgrove. 280 P.2d 453, 455
(1955).
The defect that Defendant complains of is nothing more than a technicality. In a
notice pleading jurisdiction like Utah, rule 8(a) "is to be liberally construed when
determining the sufficiency of a plaintiff s complaint," Gill v. Timm. 720 P.2d 1352,
1353 (Utah 1986) and the text of rule 8 itself declares that "all pleadings shall be so
construed as to do substantial justice." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(f). The fundamental purpose of
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the liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties the privilege of presenting whatever
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute, and Plaintiffs have properly
pleaded a cause of action for their wrongful discharges regardless of the source of the law
the Court decides is applicable.
The District Court merely concluded that without the word "Idaho," no cause of
action existed despite the fact that the facts underlying the cause of action were explicitly
manifest. (Summary Judgment Order at 2); (R. 919). This assertion is directly
contradicted by Utah law. In Union Bank v. Swenson. this Court discussed the pleadings
necessary to raise an affirmative defense. The plaintiff argued that the defendant did not
say "fraud" in its answer and since fraud (unlike the tort of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy) must be pleaded with particularity, it failed to raise a defense.
See 707 P.2d 663, 668 (Utah 1985). However, this court disagreed, stating,
In light of the fundamental purpose of our pleading rules to afford the
parties the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they
have pertaining to the dispute, appellants are not as a matter of law
foreclosed from asserting defenses based on "fraud" by their failure to use
the term "fraud" or a derivative thereof.

14
Therefore, because Plaintiffs' pleadings were not required to include the word
"Idaho" to give proper notice to Defendant, this Court should reverse the Summary
Judgment Order.
V.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR CIVIL CONSPIRACY WAS PROPER,
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AND DEFENDANT'S "NO-EVIDENCE" ARGUMENT FAILS.
In the Summary Judgment Order, the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claim for
civil conspiracy because it found "no evidence of Defendant conspiring or interacting
with any other person regarding Plaintiffs." (Summary Judgment Order at 3); (R. 920).
Defendant's defenses to Plaintiffs' conspiracy claims were simply that there was
no evidence of a conspiracy, and that the claim should be dismissed since Amalgamated
could not conspire with itself. (Defendant's S.J. Memo at 17); (R. 340). Defendant's first
defense is insufficient because the proper method for defending against such a claim is to
submit an affidavit averring, "We did not conspire with anybody." See Thayne v.
Beneficial Utah, Inc.. 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994) (holding that where defendant
presented an affidavit claiming that it did not conspire with anybody, the burden to show
a dispute as to any material fact by presentation of admissible evidence shifted to the
plaintiff).
Defendant's second defense is also insufficient in that it misconstrued Plaintiffs'
allegations. Plaintiffs never claimed that Defendant conspired with itself, but that it
conspired with individuals acting outside of their duties in the company. (Complaint ffl[
55-57); (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 38); (R. 15, 480).
Defendant did not support its conclusory motion for summary judgment with any
admissible evidence. Instead it improperly attempted to shift the burden to the Plaintiffs,
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and the Court improperly granted its unsupported Motion for Summary Judgment.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the Summary Judgment Order.
VI.

IN DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND MOTION TO DISMISS, MANY OF ITS "FACTS"
BLATANTLY MISREPRESENTED THE TRUTH AND WERE
THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE FOR CONSIDERATION OF
JUDGMENT.

Defendant misquoted and took out of context some miscellaneous statements made
by Plaintiffs. However, it is the Court's duty to determine whether the asserted facts were
material, whether the facts were supported, and whether the facts precluded questions of
fact as a matter of law. Moreover, Defendant's arguments failed to address essential
elements of the causes of action it purported to address. The more egregious of these
misrepresentations are as follow:
Misrepresentation No. 1: In Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint ("Defendant's Dismissal
Reply Memo"), it wrote: "Waddoups in his deposition testified that he 'never' said to the
Company that he was thinking of going public with any concern about contaminated
sugar." (Defendant's Dismissal Reply Memo at 6); (R. 1187). However, in his
deposition, Mr. Waddoups specifically testified about his conversations with management
regarding his thought of making Defendant's actions known to the public. (Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions against
Defendant and/or its Counsel -- W. Mark Gavre ("Plaintiffs' Rule 11 Memo") at 2); (R.
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1257).
Misrepresentation No. 2: In Defendant's Dismissal Reply Memo, it wrote that
"[t]he one case cited by plaintiffs" did not support Plaintiffs' argument regarding Idaho
law. (Defendant's Dismissal Reply Memo at 3) (emphasis added); (R. 1184). In reality,
Plaintiffs cited four cases. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 5); (R. 1058).
Misrepresentation No. 3: In Defendant's Dismissal Reply Memo, it asserted that
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint was a Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Defendant's Dismissal Reply Memo, at 2, n. 1); (R. 1183).
However, Defendant's Motion was labeled as a "Motion to Dismiss." (Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 1); (R. 1019). "Motion to Dismiss"
is a term of art that all competent lawyers know references Rule 12. A reply
memorandum is not permitted to change the basis of a motion. This Court ruled in
Colman v. Utah State Land Board, ruled that neither a movant nor a district court can
convert a Rule 12 motion to a Rule 56 motion where the non-movant relies upon the
motion being one premised exclusively upon points of law. See 795 P.2d 622 (Utah
1990); see also Defendant's S.J. Memo, which began with a set of what it called
"background facts" instead of following the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Code of
Judicial Administration which requires a movant to begin its memorandum with a set of
facts which it argues is material and to which it argues no dispute exists, (at pp. 3-8); (R.
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420-25). The Code of Judicial Administration is binding upon litigants and the Courts.
See Price v. Armour. 332 Adv. Rep. 3, 5;

P.2d

(Utah 1997) (holding that the

trial court erred in not following the Code of Judicial Administration).
Misrepresentation No. 4: In Defendant's Dismissal Reply Memo, it asserted:
"The one court to have addressed [the claim that persons protected by a just-cause
provision may also assert a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy]
rejected it." (Defendant's Dismissal Reply Memo, at p.3, n. 2 (emphasis added)); (R.
1184). The truth is that more than just "the one" court addressed the claim. For example,
this Court considered and rejected Defendant's conclusory assertions in no uncertain
terms in Retherford: "Both respect for precedent and sound public policy compel the
conclusion that the tort of discharge in violation of public policy should be available to all
employees, regardless of their contractual status." 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992).
Misrepresentation No. 5: In oral argument, Defendant told the District Court that
Plaintiffs were claiming "here today for the first time" that their firings were based on a
refusal to violate the law. (Plaintiffs' Rule 11 Memo at 10); (R. 1265) On the contrary,
Plaintiffs' Complaint, which was filed almost four years prior, alleged the following:
25. Sometime in March of 1995 Messrs. Waddoups and Sparrow
complained to Amalgamated that their signatures accompanied the
possibly unlawful shipments of Quarantined Sugar and complained
further that sales of the Adulterated Sugar could implicate them in
potentially fraudulent sales of contaminated sugar at clean sugar prices.
(R.7)
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Misrepresentation No. 6: Defendant quoted selected misleading portions of Mr.
Sparrow's deposition which, it asserted, demonstrated that Plaintiffs' legal arguments
were contradicted by their deposition testimony and exclaimed: "Similarly, Waddoups
testified about why he believed he was fired . . . as a potential 'whistleblower,' not about
any supposed refusal to violate the law." (Response to Plaintiffs Second Motion for a
New Trial or to Alter or Amend Judgment at 2-5 (emphasis added)); (R. 1251-1254) The
truth is that in his deposition, Mr. Waddoups very clearly stated that he was fired for
refusing to violate the law and refusing to assist Defendant in its violations of the law.
(Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Sanctions against Defendant
and its Counsel Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 11. ("Plaintiffs 2nd Rule 11 Motion") at 2-6);
(R. 1353-57). _Mr. Sparrow also indicated that he fell into disfavor with Defendant for his
refusals to violate the law, threats of exposure, and advocacy for the proposition that
Amalgamated should have only held for sale and sold clean, unadulterated food product.
See id; (R. 1353-57).
None "of these misrepresentations were discredited by the District Court, leading
Plaintiffs to believe that the court relied upon them in making its decisions to issue the
Summary Judgment Order and the Order of Dismissal. However, misrepresentations are
inadmissible as evidence and therefore cannot be used in making a summary judgment.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the Summary Judgment Order.
VII.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
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WAS PREMATURE BECAUSE IT HAD NOT ALLOWED
PLAINTIFFS SUFFICIENT TIME TO CONDUCT
DISCOVERY.
In response to Defendant's improper "no-evidence" motion, Plaintiffs moved for a
continuance in order to conduct additional discovery to support their claims. But see.
Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 668 (Utah 1985) ("The functions of issue-formation and factrevelation are appropriately left to the deposition-discovery process."). If the District Court
believed that Defendant's motion was ripe and supported, the Court should have granted a
continuance to allow discovery where this Defendant did not cooperate with any discovery
relying on bald conclusions masquerading as "objections" and the novel theory discovery
was not required for documents that it did not believe supported its defenses for two years.
(R. 352). Plaintiffs' need to conduct further discovery is evidenced in part by the District
Court's Summary Judgment Order on the basis that there was "no evidence" to support the
claims. (Summary Judgment Order at 2-3), (R. 1919-20).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should reverse the District Court's
rulings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / ^

day of January, 2001.

CARR & WADDOUPS
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